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Russian Society and Elites in 1989-2009: 
Transformation Results and Future Perspectives 
Oxana Gaman-Golutvina ∗ 
Abstract: »Russische Gesellschaft und Eliten 1989-2009: Ergebnisse der 
Transformation und zukünftige Perspektiven«. The article covers the results of 
two decades of transition of Russia after 1989, putting an accent on three main 
issues: the configuration of the research-object (post-socialist Russia in com-
parison with other post-Soviet counties), the results of transition, and its main 
actors. The author maintains that in the Russian case of transition, transforma-
tion rather than modernization is the appropriate notion for the definition of the 
process during the past two decades’. In Russia we deal with the contradictory 
combination of a relatively successful political modernization and very contro-
versial results in the economical domain. Neither in 1990, nor in 2000 was the 
modernization project fully realized. A systematic and comprehensive mod-
ernization that was set as the main transformation task in the beginning of the 
transition process is still at the national agenda. However, a modernization 
strategy is difficult to be followed both for historical reasons and current cir-
cumstances. The author considers two types of limitations impeding the reali-
zation of the modernization project – one is historically determined and one is 
contemporary, both with an accent on the value orientations of elite and mass 
groups. 
Keywords: transformation, transition, modernization, elites, mass groups, val-
ues, socialization. 
 
The landmark of 2009 may be considered as a significant event for many rea-
sons. The most important of them is the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 
events that served as a turning point in the history of many post-socialist coun-
ties, first of all in Central and Eastern Europe, but marked also an important 
milestone in the USSR’s political evolution. This essential moment allows us to 
re-think the last two decades’ transition results and makes it possible to concep-
tualize better the processes taking place in post-communist countries. A rele-
vant approach demands the analysis of three main points: the clarification of 
the object under investigation (i.e. post-socialist countries), the results of the 
process, and its main actors. The article is devoted to all three issues with an 
accent on the last one. 
The clarification of the object may start from following position. In recent 
years, a number of scholars have spoken out against comparing post-
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communist countries with each other and against the summary use of the term 
of “post-communist country,” for such countries as the Czech Republic and 
Turkmenistan have little in common today from a political and economic 
standpoint. However, I tend to side with the position of those experts (see for 
example Makarenko 2008) that reject this view as being inadequate for at least 
three reasons. 
First of all, the similarity of post-communist countries stems not only from 
their relative geographic proximity in a region stretching from Central Europe 
to Mongolia but also from the many characteristics that they had in common at 
the start of transition: there are a sufficient number of criteria to consider the 
initial state of political development of these countries in the late eighties and 
early nineties to be more or less the same. These criteria include a single domi-
nating ideology (in different variations); the lack (total or partial) of private 
property and poorly developed market relations; similar institutional models of 
state structure (different versions of party states); and the relative similarity of 
political culture that took shape in this geographic region over the second half 
of the 20th century (despite certain national differences). 
Secondly, although there are considerable variations between different sub-
groups of post-communist countries, one can identify a lot of common traits 
and similar models of transformation within each subgroup, which makes it 
possible to evaluate the effects of institutional choices and political decisions 
on the countries’ development. 
Finally, few countries have reached a level at which one can speak with cer-
tainty of the success or failure of modernization. Therefore, during the subse-
quent expansion or curtailment of transformation processes in these countries, 
factors that marked the development of their neighbors in preceding years may 
arise (Makarenko, 2008). 
The second issue of the analysis – content of the process – seems to be more 
important. During the first stages of post-socialist transformations, people 
tended to view the latter from the standpoint of the progressivist paradigm of a 
linear movement along the trajectory “erosion and breakup of authoritarianism 
– state-controlled liberalization – institutional democratization – non-consoli-
dated democracy – democratic consolidation.” However, it already became 
clear during the first years of reforms that, in a number of cases (that were 
numerous in the post-Soviet space), it was not a question of the movement 
from authoritarianism to democracy but of the transformation of one type of 
non-democratic regime into another that often led to the consolidation of a 
“new autocracy.” “In a number of cases, one can state with certainty that we 
are dealing not with ‘transition’ states but with well-consolidated political 
regimes of a new type that do not fit into the logic of ‘drawn-out democratiza-
tion’” (Roeder 2004, 94; Mel’vil’ 2004, 65, 71; Oleinik and Gaman-Golutvina 
2008). 
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Changes in political practices led to changes in their conceptualization. Dur-
ing the early stages, the concept of modernization was the most widely used: 
despite the diversity of approaches to the study of socio-historical processes 
denoted by this concept, the latter clearly includes the notion of a transition 
from social structures of the “traditional” (“archaic”) type to social structures 
that began to develop intensively in the Western European cultural realm in the 
16th and 17th centuries. 
At the same time, one should keep in mind that there are two interpretations 
of the criteria of modernization in scholarly works. The first interpretation 
arose in the 1950s-1970s through the study of the experience of countries that 
shook off colonial rule. It laid an emphasis on the socioeconomic criteria of 
modernization (level of economic and technological development with an 
emphasis on industrialization; scope and quality of education among the popu-
lation; scope and quality of vertical mobility; etc.). The second approach took 
shape in the 1980s and 1990s and stressed the importance of the political di-
mensions of modernization with an emphasis on the importance of political 
pluralism (division of powers, competitive elections, multiparty system, free-
dom of information, and multichannel access to it). Considering the evolution 
of post-communist countries over the last twenty years, one can state with 
certainty that, although a correlation between the socioeconomic and political 
dimensions of modernization is to be expected and often exists, it is not neces-
sary. A competitive political environment can exist in problematic socioeco-
nomic conditions, while good indicators of socioeconomic development do not 
always coincide with modernization in the political sphere. 
After scrutinizing the contemporary history of a number of post-communist 
states, people have begun to put in doubt the universal nature of the moderniza-
tion project. The classical theory of modernization, which is based on a strict 
dichotomy, is clearly shifting towards a less rigid theoretical scheme. The 
experience of reform in post-socialist societies has led scholars to employ a 
notion of transformation that rejects the teleological interpretation of the proc-
ess and focuses on the multivariate, unpredictable, and ambiguous nature of 
political development. Although no one doubts that transformation is a target-
oriented process, its results can never be predicted ahead of time. The notion of 
transformation includes the understanding that the results of development are 
unpredictable, for, in the course of large-scale transformation, the goals of 
development also change constantly, as they are correlated with the specific 
socioeconomic, political, national, and other characteristics of the transforming 
society. The more radical and the more incipient the transformation, the less 
defined its vector of evolution. 
The aforementioned “unpredictability” as a characteristic of the transforma-
tion process means that its results include the appearance of new forms or new 
connections. Transformation is complex target-oriented change of society as a 
holistic social and cultural system that acquires new structural elements in the 
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process. The latter, in turn, define and evoke new types of social action. At the 
same time, social change leads not only to the emergence and institutionaliza-
tion of new elements of culture and social structure on the local, national, or 
global scale but also to their transformation into sociocultural standards that 
determine social activity aimed at introducing (consolidating) or rejecting 
innovation:  
Transformation is mutually stimulating change of models of social action, on 
the one hand, and of the functioning of social institutions connected with the 
intentional and target-oriented impact of nominal rules (formal norms, proce-
dures, or laws), on the other (Diskin 1999, 5). 
In other words, transformation is a complex system of institutional and pro-
cedural changes: on the one hand, it is the rational and target-oriented change 
of nominal rules (formal norms, procedures, and laws) that has an impact on 
the mechanism of the functioning of social institutions; on the other, it is linked 
to the change of models of the cultural, socioeconomic, and political activity of 
people. As a result, processes of social transformation are longer, more com-
plex, and more contradictory than other known forms of change, for it is a 
question of the transformation of social structures, the creation of new social 
strata, and the consolidation of society in its new form. 
As concerns the Russian case of transition, transformation rather than mod-
ernization is the more appropriate notion for the definition of two decades of 
change in Russia since 1989. More correctly: in Russia we deal with the con-
tradictionary combination of a relatively successful political modernization and 
relatively poor results in the economical domain (i.e. economical decline at the 
end of 1990th, when the GDP dropped by about 50 % as compared with the 
beginning of the 1990th; unstable growth after the turn of the century). From a 
general point of view and in particular compared to other developing econo-
mies in the context of the BRIC-group (namely China) Russia lags behind in 
terms of quality and speed of its economic growth during the 1989-2009 pe-
riod. The goal of economic modernization that was set as the main transforma-
tion tasks in the beginning of the transition process are still at the national 
agenda. 
Moreover, in 2009-2010 the idea of modernization obtained second wind. In 
a programmatic article of president D. Medvedev “Rossiya, vpered” (2009) 
(Russia, forward) and in the 2009 president’s message to the federal parliament 
modernization obtained the status of a main policy objective. Supposedly this 
slogan will top the electoral program agenda in the case of Medevedev’s par-
ticipation in the 2012 presidential campaign. To my mind the idea of moderni-
zation and the corresponding agenda are relevant to vital national tasks; namely 
post-industrial modernization may become the key factor for solving a great 
number of problems in Russian society – from poverty to drug addiction. How-
ever, whatever the importance of the goal may be, a modernization strategy 
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does not look easy to be put interpractice – both for historical reasons and 
current circumstances. Let us start from the historical aspects. 
The difficulties of implanting modernization projects in historical Russia 
were traditionally rooted in the weakness of inner impulses within the frame-
work of Russian traditional model of accelerated modernization according to 
which the country developed during the last several decades (in details see: 
Gaman-Golutvina 2009). The impetus for modernization in the historical past 
derived as a rule from outside as the results of unsuccessful competition with 
geopolitical rivals. One more difficulty was the fact that the modernization 
goals and objectives were tasks that left the capabilities of society behind. This 
circumstance, in turn, determined the prejudice of many social groups – both 
elite and mass – towards modernization projects. As to mass groups, their 
indifference to modernization was due to the fact that, for large groups of Rus-
sians, modernizations were historically accompanied by overexertion and over-
exploitation and, hence, violence (in order to compensate the scarcity of other 
resources for development – financial, material, temporal, etc.). The Russian 
empire was constructed “through a process of genuinely inhuman fight for 
survival … The Russian empire was built and defended by the people at a cost 
of unprecedented human sacrifice” (Solonevich 1991, 244). Moreover, “only 
through the use of extreme and all-encompassing pressure, iron discipline and 
terrible human losses could this … state exist” (Fedotov 1992, 284). The re-
forms of Peter I or Stalinist industrialization both were founded on the “bones 
of Russians”. Congruently the famous Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky 
wrote that the exhaustion of the overworked forces of the nation during Peter 
I’s transformation was so great as if it has been fighting not only for Karelia 
and Livonia, but for all of Sweden, or even five Swedens (Klyuchevsky 1993, 
579) 
But these tasks were determined more by the necessity of people’s survival 
in the situation of a competition with successful geopolitical rivals, rather than 
were dictated by ruling elites’ arbitrariness. Hence, quite often the authorities 
acted as the lash that whipped the country’s development, sometimes contrary 
to their own will. The fate of Alexander II who initiated, under the pressure of 
the defeat in the Crimean War, the Great Reforms of the 1860s-1870s (to some 
extent contrary to his political convictions), may be considered as an example. 
As for the political class, its ambiguous but mostly negative attitude toward 
modernization projects was conditioned by the fact that modernizations in 
historical Russia were accompanied, as a rule, by large-scale purges of the 
political class. These purges were aimed at securing the maximal effectiveness 
of the administrative apparatus in its capacity as the prime modernization 
agent. The most vivid example are the reprisals of the 1930s when the so-called 
old Lenin’s guard was replaced by a “military-sportive class” (G. Fedotov) – 
“iron Commissars and iron Party secretaries”. 
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As to the attitudes towards modernization in the post-Soviet period, these at-
titudes changed in two waves. The first post-Soviet decade was marked by a 
choice in favor of stagnation. And this choice was rather consensual despite a 
huge gap between the elites and the general population with regard to value 
orientations, income levels and social capital. What united elites and the popu-
lation at large was their rejection of ‘development’ as a valued trajectory for 
social and economic change. In the 1990th the negative consensus about stag-
nation united both the elites and the population at large. So the “Third Rome” 
(the famous definition of Russia in Slavophile rhetoric) wound up in the Third 
World. 
The start of the second post-Soviet decade was marked by the gradual re-
vival of society’s interest to strategy problems. The key “message” of V. 
Putin’s presidential campaign in 1999-2000 was the idea of modernization. 
Putin’s success at the 2000 elections showed that society began to take an 
interest problem of development. Nevertheless, these ideas remained to a large 
extent unrealized: despite the considerable financial assets accumulated in 
Russia as a result of the increase of oil prices in 2003-2008 (about 700 billion 
dollars according to expert estimates; Volkov 2008), Russia was unable to 
effectuate a development model. During the period 2000-2008 a model of 
“growth without development” was implemented. Despite the announcement 
of an ambitious “energetic superpower” project, in practice Russia became a 
trite petrostate (Goldman 2008). 
To our opinion, this was not mere the result of a simple administrative mis-
take but stemmed from the elite’s conscious choice in favour of the petrostate 
model and, in a broader context, the elite’s continuing rejection of the moderni-
zation idea. Russian elites are still strategically inert. They are characterized by 
weak strategic initiative and weak concern about problems of strategy. 
As to the causes of this situation, the first and most evident one is the fact 
that elite groups became the main beneficiary of post-Soviet transformation in 
Russia. The post-Soviet period in Russia became the epoch of an “elites revolu-
tion”. Whereas the 20th century was marked by clear domination of an egalitar-
ian paradigm, the last decade of the 20th century became the time of an elite 
triumph. Under the slogan of democratization the elite became the genuine 
master of the country, interested in preserving the status quo. 
The high level of conflicts in intra-elite relations is another reason of the 
post-Soviet elite’s weakness as a modernization agent. However, the most 
profound reason of the ineffectiveness of today’s elite as a developmental agent 
is largely determined by the considerable political, psychological, and moral 
costs of the forced accelerated modernizations during previous historical peri-
ods and the deformations that had arisen in the course of that development. The 
current elite’s indifference to strategy is the flip side and result of hypertrophy-
ing the eschatological orientation of the historical project of accelerated mod-
ernization with its emphasis on the value of the future and the instrumental 
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quality of the present. To paraphrase John F. Kennedy, one could say that Rus-
sians were asked for so long predominantly about what they could do for their 
country that currently most citizens and especially elites are interested only in 
what their country can do for them. This accounts for the famous paradox that, 
while the industrial modernization in the 1930s-1950s was implemented by 
descendants of peasants and first-generation intellectuals, the outcome of po-
litical activities of the governmental officials of the 1990s (the high number of 
members with academic degrees and titles in the administrative bodies of Rus-
sia in the 1990s was unprecedented in the history of the country) was a sys-
temic crisis. And this is not a result of the administrative incapacity of this 
generation as is sometimes assumed: Simply, development (systemic moderni-
zation) was not the initial task of reform. The slogan of the process was distri-
bution. And the strength of this (re-)distributive passion was determined by the 
huge potential of accumulated dissatisfaction within the elite resulting from the 
psychological aftermath of the contradiction between the function of control 
and opportunities of appropriation that was experienced by Soviet nomencla-
ture, whose successor became the current elite. Controlling colossal state re-
sources, the CPSU nomenclatura was rather poor, and by the standards of to-
day, even destitute. Most of the property belonging even to high ranking 
officials was public: Furniture bore the stamps of the administration and prop-
erty was regularly inventoried. Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Allilueva, remem-
bered how her father impressed upon her and her brother Vasily an understand-
ing of the temporary nature of leaders’ privileges: “Dachas, flats, cars – all 
these do not belong to you, and you should not think of them as yours” (Al-
lilueva 1990; 159). The following episode illustrated how much this contradic-
tion traumatized the generation of the late-Soviet nomenclatura. Andrei 
Grachev, the former press-secretary of Mikhail Gorbachev, recalls a visit by 
the Gorbachev couple to France in 1989. When the French president’s wife, 
Danielle Mitterrand suggested to Raisa Gorbacheva (who had praised the 
honey put on the table for breakfast) that she would send her several bee-hives 
for their country home, Raisa clapped her hands and reproachfully said to Gor-
bachev:”How many times have I asked you, Mikhail Sergeevich, to refuse state 
dachas and to get even a small plot of land! You see, right now, we have noth-
ing to call our own – we’d have nowhere to put a beehive!” (Grachev, 1994).  
Indeed, the Soviet nomenklatura – the ruling class of the Soviet society – 
was a class of “servants without rights” as no other power elite (for more de-
tails, see Gaman-Golutvina, 2006). Endowed with rather modest benefits (com-
pared even with the Western middle class), the nomenklatura had to hide them 
away constantly, and always fearful that what was acquired yesterday would be 
taken back tomorrow. It is the contradiction between the right of use (truly 
large-scale and sometimes practically unlimited) and the right of possession 
(or, to be more exact, the lack of it) that became the principal contradiction, 
inducing the Soviet ruling class to become the gravedigger of the Soviet sys-
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tem. Thus it is no wonder that the prevailing impetus of the new elite became 
the desire to get everything here and now. 
The failure of the modernization project and the partial re-archaization of 
social life became a by-product of such attitude. Another natural consequence 
in this context became the partial regression in the elite formation processes, 
that took place partly in Russia and much more in some other post-Soviet coun-
tries (first of all in the post-Soviet Central Asia and South Caucasus states). 
These processes were marked by a transition from the modern principles of 
bureaucratic recruiting to recruitment based on traditionalistic forms. In Russia, 
this principle meant merging power and money; in Kazakhstan zhuses formed 
again and acquired a political status; in Tajikistan landsmen clans revived; in 
Turkmenia – kin clans; in Chechnya – teips. Such transformations make it 
possible to speak of the partial re-archaization of elite formation processes. 
That is why the greatest and simultaneously most complicated problem in the 
present modernization context is to stimulate an orientation towards moderni-
zation values within the political class. Naturally, carrying out a modernization 
project requires not only drawing up a concept and strategy of development but 
also and above all stimulating the elite’s political commitment to this strategy 
in corresponding practical policy. The profound indifference of the current 
elite to the idea of development is really problematic, since namely elite groups 
are responsible for setting the national agenda. Although power groups in Rus-
sia have practically unlimited possibilities to exert influence, these groups are 
still rather ineffective in realization of a modernization project. 
What are the perspectives of a modernization project in future? While think-
ing about the likehood of a re-orientation of the values of both the political 
class and mass groups in favour of a developmental values and a modernization 
strategy, it should be borne in mind that this kind of reorientation is not merely 
a matter of subjective preference, but is also determined to a large extent by the 
objective laws of the long waves of alternations between public opinion’s at-
tachment to universal values and private ones. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that social life changes in cyclical rhythm. “The change of landmarks” can be 
found in American history. It is well known that the characteristics of Ameri-
cans noted by de Tocqueville in the first and second volumes of his famous 
work “Democracy in America” (though mere five years passed between the 
writing of the first (1835) and the second (1840) volumes), were very different. 
In the first volume, de Tocqueville noted energy, sympathy, civic activity, and 
an attachment to social interests while assessing American society. If the 
Americans “had to concern themselves only with their own affairs, their lives 
would lose half their meaning and would seem empty, and they would feel 
extremely unhappy” (Tocqueville 1994, 191). Yet in the second volume, which 
came out, as we have noted, only half a decade later, de Tocqueville depicted 
the American as weak, servile, and powerless, entirely absorbed in his private 
interests. The renowned American historian, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., after com-
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paring such different characteristics, came to the conclusion that social activity 
and private interests swing, pendulum-like, between private concerns (self-
interest) and general interest (patriotism).  
The American can be so absorbed by his private concerns as if he is absolutely 
alone in this world, yet, the next moment he devotes himself to the social in-
terests. At times it seems as though he is motivated by total greed, and at oth-
ers, by whole-hearted patriotism 
 – it was on the basis of this reflection of de Tocqueville that Schlesinger 
rested his idea of American history cycles, defining a cycle as the perpetual 
movement between the nation’s adherence to the social concerns, on the one 
hand, and to the individual interests, on the other (Tocqueville 1994). 
Schlesinger’s own research provides a convincing argument in favour of the 
notion that while elaborating the forecast of the society’s perspectives of de-
velopmental strategy taking into account the peculiarities of the public mood 
cyclical nature. 
As to the current attitudes of Russians towards developmental values, Rus-
sian society seems to be tired of two last decades of stagnation-stability. It 
seems to be ready to move towards modernization values and orientations. 
Modernization tasks are also at the agenda of intra-elite discussions. But mod-
ernization in contemporary Russia has two influential opponents. One of them 
is gas and oil companies that are not interested in high-tech development for 
reasons of competition. The configuration of the other opponent is quite un-
usual: I mean the common people and TV. Or to be more correct: common 
people watching TV – common not in the sense of social status but regarding 
the intellectual dimension. “Simple” one-dimensional (consume-oriented) 
people may become more serious obstacles to modernization processes than 
even the oil and gas lobby. As to the oil-gas lobbyists their attitude towards 
modernization is rather clear: oil and gas companies are interested in preserv-
ing the current rent-seeking economic structure. Possessing giant resources, oil-
gas business quite effectively lobbies its interests. For example in 2009 under 
the pressure of “Gasprom” Russian government made the far-going decision to 
increase the energy prices for gas for internal consumers by 27%, that meant 
shifting approximately 80 billion (!) of dollars from high tech branches to the 
oil and gas industry. This decision may reduce the competitiveness of Russia’s 
economy in general.  
Concerning the second opponent the picture is not so clear. The intellectual 
dimension of society is important if the final aim of the contemporary stage of 
modernization is defined as the creation of knowledge based economy. The 
experience of other countries that successfully embarked on this way shows 
that the quality of human potential is the main precondition for a successful 
pursuit of this trajectory. That was the reason for the intensive effort under-
taken in this direction in countries that succeeds in the creation of a knowledge 
based economy (including such diverse countries like the USA or Singapore). 
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Achievement of high quality human resources demands not only active social 
policy but also on orientation of the general population towards modernization 
values. In this context it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the 
medias’ role because in contemporary society namely mass media act not only 
as key socialization institutions but may also act as an influential moderniza-
tion agent. 
What is the state of Russian mass media in this respect? And to what extent 
do they really act as the promoters of a modernization agenda? The answer to 
these questions may clarify the perspective of Russian society in future evolu-
tion. The role and particularities of Russian media in the modernization context 
become clear when one studies the content of Russian television as the most 
effective and widespread media instrument with the greatest audience (the daily 
TV audience in Russia is at least three times greater as the Internet audience 
and reaches a total of 95 to 102 million people over the age of four).The trans-
formation of the mechanisms and channels of socialization over last twenty 
years has turned television into the priority agent of socialization in general and 
political socialization in particular. Today, it is television that forms the mean-
ings, content, and agenda of the public (and, in many ways, private) life of 
Russian citizens. 57 out of 100 Russian citizens turn on the television when 
they come home; their perception and understanding of what is taking place 
today is almost totally determined by television. However, although it is one of 
the mass media, television informs only 8-10% of viewers that watch news 
(and, more rarely, analytic) programs. Polls taken by Gallup Media in 2008 
showed that the public demand for news and analytic programs has fallen 
greatly. Although the number of news programs has more than doubled over 
the past two years as a result of the 2007-2008 federal electoral cycle and the 
appearance of two new news channels (Euronews and Vesti), the ratings and 
audience of each individual program has greatly fallen. One of the causes is the 
greater ease with which one can get news from the Internet. Yet a more impor-
tant reason is that entertainment programs have become a powerful competitor 
of news. Expert surveys show that the audience of news and analytic programs 
declined considerably in 2008. “Studies conducted in 2008 show that contem-
porary Russian media totally focus on entertainment, which has made its way 
into all spheres of television today.” Moreover, experts note that it is not only a 
case of the popularity of sports programs (at least three multi-hour programs 
per week), humor programs (at least 15 programs during the weekend prime-
time alone), and programs about the lives of stars or bandits (at least a hundred 
programs in different formats per week) but also of the stylistic and content-
based transformation of formats that were initially totally alien to the enter-
tainment format (news programs, documental films, and the selection of televi-
sion hosts). “Today, everything on television is subordinated to the philosophy 
of entertainment,” writes the television and cinema critic D. Dondurei (Don-
durei 2009). His studies of the changes in viewer preferences in 2008 have 
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shown that Russian citizens spend almost 70% of their TV time on entertain-
ment programs – TV serials, movies, and entertainment programs proper such 
as humor programs, concerts, games, etc. The viewing time of serials has par-
ticularly increased: from 34% in 2002 to 46.4% in 2008. Russia ranks first in 
the world today in the number of serials shown on free nationwide channels 
(Dondurei, 2009). 
These large-scale changes are clearly not accidental. One may ask about the 
sources of these trends and the forces behind them. Without a doubt, such a 
model of television serves the interests of TV management (directors of TV 
channels) and shareholders (formally, government officials that are in charge of 
television; in reality, government officials who direct the sphere of state ideol-
ogy as a whole). For TV bosses, ratings are not only the exclusive criteria for 
evaluating TV products but also the measure of the entire media system as a 
whole. 
Ratings, which are formally only a means of measuring the media audience, 
have grown from being a technical tool to serving as the chief benchmark for 
the entire production of all Russian TV content. One must attain at any price 
high program ratings (the percentage ratio of the program audience to the en-
tire national audience) and program shares (the percentage ratio of the pro-
gram audience to the total audience watching television at that time). After all, 
these figures completely determine the cost of advertisement that is broadcast 
during the programs and consequently the enormous profits of TV channels in 
general (over 4.5 billion dollars in 2008), 
experts note (Dondurei 2009). 
Surely TV covering is definitely not one-colour, but the sociopolitical 
themes found on television today quite often reflect predominantly differences 
of opinions inside power elites (the notorious war between “Kremlin towers”) 
rather than the spectrum of opinions in society as a whole. As a rule the televi-
sion mainstream is rather friendly towards the Kremlin’s general line. This was 
particularly evident during the economic crisis. During the first stage, the very 
existence of the crisis became a “state secret”: in October 2008, the media were 
prohibited from using the word “crisis.” Later, when the crisis became apparent 
to Russians even without TV, television adopted the stance of a total and un-
questioning approval of the government’s anti-crisis measures. Although not 
only experts (see the World Bank Report1) but also the Russian president D. 
Medvedev subsequently recognized that many of the government’s anti-crisis 
measures were ineffective, the latter never became a focus of discussions on 
television. 
To be fair, it should be said that harmony can never be attained in the rela-
tions between the government and the opposition (this is true of all countries, 
not just Russia). Yet the key element is the agenda set by television, its content, 
                                                             
1  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/rer18eng.pdf. 
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the nature of TV influence, and its messages and metaphysics. Experts show a 
rare consensus in the evaluation of these parameters on Russian TV: the 
metameaning of television has become entertainment, and its result is a regres-
sive selection. It is known that the human socio-psychological sphere has two 
vectors of motion: one of them is pointed upwards for developing efforts for 
the development of human potential, abilities, talent, and moral and ethical 
qualities; the other is pointed at the dark depths of the human subconscious and 
basic instincts and leads to degradation and personal and social disintegration. 
Handling with the “upper floor” of the individual gives rise to an upwards 
motion both of the individual and society, while the exploitation of the “lower 
floor” that has not been subject to cultural interdictions not only leads to a 
greater influence of the “depths” but can also make them capable of overpow-
ering the cultural sphere (Dondurei, 2009). At the same time, it is clear that an 
upward motion always demands work and effort, while a downward motion 
(plunging the TV audience into the dark world of pathologies, anomalies, scan-
dals, and perversions) is easier, more profitable, and demands no effort. When 
one of these formats becomes “mainstream” and becomes predominant, it leads 
to a certain type of sociality: the TV audience is developing in the case of the 
upward motion and degrading in the case of the downward motion (for more 
details see Dyczok and Gaman-Golutvina, 2009). Moreover, there is a clear 
correlation between the vectors of social and individual development: Mod-
ernization needs progress in both vectors, while social degradation inevitably 
leads to intellectual and moral individual disintegration. Given the sociopoliti-
cal nature of the TV-format dominating today, there is no doubt that it may 
result in a considerable decline of the modernization potential of society. 
To set Russia on the track of modernization requires therefore not only a in-
dustrial policy re-formatting, but also a re-setting of the mental, intellectual, 
moral and metaphysical agendas. And this goal is much more difficult than the 
reorientation of industrial policy – it needs much more efforts in terms of time, 
resources and patience. In particular such a re-setting is impossible without a 
transformation of contemporary Russian state’s role and its functions. The 
experience of the most rapidly developing counties testifies that the state plays 
a decisive part in modernization. Re-formatting contemporary Russian’ state in 
favor of a strategy for development is one of the most complicated tasks be-
cause of the domination of the minimal state paradigm during last two decades. 
The transformation of the state needs strong political will, intensive efforts and 
genuine revolution in perception by both, elites and mass groups. But without 
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